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These Briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force on 
the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, in an 
organized, summary form, the proposals and s~ggestions which the authorities 
in the Member States, the Union's institutions and specialist commentators 
have put forward on ·the issues likely to be on the IGC/96 agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
1 The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration 
5 The common foreign and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
7 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 Codecision procedure 
9 CJHA 
1 0 European citizenship 
11 WEU, security and defence 
12 Public services 
13 Social policy 
14 The European Parliament 
15 The European Council 
16 The Council of the European Union 
17 The budget and the IGC 
18 The IGC and transparency 
19 Subsidiarity and demarcat~on of responsibilities. 
20 The Union's legal personality 
21 Commitology -
22 Fundamental rights 
23 The IGC and the democratic nature of the Union 
24 Coherence of the external action of the EU 
25 The 1996 IGC and the effectiveness of the Union 
26 Europol · 
27 The IGC and the Schengen Convention 
28 Combating fraud 
29 Energy 
30 Tourism and the IGC 
31 Economic and social cohesion 
32 European Environment Policy and the IGC 
33 The CAP and the IGC 
34 Civil protection and the IGC 
35 Non-discrimination on grounds of sex 
36 EU enlargement 
37 Employment and the IGC 
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BRIEFING 
ON 
SUBSIDIARITY AND DEMARCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
I. AGENDA FOR THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
The SUBSIDIARITY principle is mentioned in the preamble to the Treaty on European 
Union, in Article B, in Article K.3(2)(b) and Article 3b. In order to clarify the 
application of the principle, the Commission Communication on the SUBSIDIARITY 
principle (27 November 1992), the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council 
( 11-12 December 1992), the Interinstitutional Declaration by the EP, Council and· 
Commission on democracy, transparency and procedures for applying the subsidiarity 
principle (25 October 1993) and the Interinstitutional Agreement (October 1993) on 
the application of this principle contain check -lists which apply to any consideration 
of a legislative proposal. 
Subsidiarity and demarcation of responsibilities may be among the matters to be 
covered by the revision to be undertaken at the 1996/1997 IGC on t~e basis of the 
Treaty itself: 
Article B, which calls for a general review of policies and forms of cooperation 'with 
the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the 
Community'. The interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency and 
subsidiarity, adopted on 25 October 1993, aims to implement the TEU in a 
democratic, open way. The declaration contains a clause whereby its substance may 
be revised if so requested by any of the signatory institutions. 
II. SOURCES 
The European Parliament delivered its opinion in its resolution on the functioning of 
the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 lnterg_oven1mental Conference 
(adopted on 18 May 1995) - paragraphs 12(i-ii), and in that on the EP's opinion on 
the convening of the Intergovernmental Conferen~e and the evaluation of the work 
of the Reflection Group (adopted on 13 March 1996) - recital F and paragraph 3. 
The Commission states its views in its report on the operation of the TEU, adopted 
on 1 0 May 1995, and its opinion on strengthening political union and preparing for 
enlargement of 28 February 1996. 
The Committee of the Regions sets out its position in its opinion on the revision of 
the TEU, adopted on 20 April 1995. 
Council/European Council/Reflection Group/Group of Personal Representatives 
The Council's thinking is set out in its report on the functioning of the TEU, adopted 
on 1 0 April 1995. 
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At the last two meetings of the European Council (in Turin on 28 and 29 March 1996 
and in Florence on 21 and 22 June 1996) the Heads of State and Government of the 
Member States set out their position on the treatment of subsidiarity at the 1996/97 
IGC. 
The Reflection Group broached the subject of subsidiarity, demarcation of 
responsibilities, and the hierarchy of Community acts in connection with Item 8 
(Instruments of the Union) of the agenda proposed for its first meeting (on 2 and 3 
June 1995). The 'instruments' topic was discussed by the Reflection Group on 24 
and 25 July, 3 and 4 October, and 13 and 14 November 1995. The views of the 
Reflection Group are set out in its report of 5 December 1995. 
The Group of Personal Government Representatives disc.ussed a paper setting out 
options for the revision of the subsidiarity principle issued by the Italian Presidency 
on 2 April 1996, a memorandum from the Netherlands' delegation submitted on 1 0 
April 1996 and a declaration by the German delegation submitted to the meeting of 
22 April1996. The report on the IGC's progress submitted to the ·Florence European 
Council by the Italian Presidency summed up the discussions within the Group of 
Personal Representatives in Chapter IV. 
All the Member States have taken a clear-cut official stand on subsidiarity, 
demarcation of responsibilities and the hierarchy of Community acts. . The 
Government of Germany and the new Government of Spain have not yet taken an 
official stand. However, statements have been issued by government ministers, and 
reports and resolutions adopted by national parliaments. As regards the attitudes of 
the national parliaments and their component bodies ~oncerned more directly with 
Community affairs, th~ Bonn COSAC meeting on 24 and 25 October 1994 discussed 
the views of the national parliaments and the European. Parliament on the manner of 
giving effect to the subsidiarity principle. A number of national parliaments, including 
chambers composed of regional representatives, have also spok~n out on the 1996 
IGC and matters pertaining to subsidiarity, demarcation of responsibil"ities, and the 
hierarchy of Community acts. In addition, political parties represented in the ·national 
parliaments have issued statements, drawn up reports, and delivered opinions. 
Ill. POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF VIEWS 
A. European Parliament 
1 . Bourlanges and Martin repor~ 
As regards the vertical demarcation of responsibilities (between the EU and the 
Member States) 
(a) 'Clarifying comoetencies 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as currently laid down in Article 3b 
of the Treaty, should be maintained and correctly apolied. 
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Establishment of a fixed list of EU and Member State competencies would be too rigid 
and too hard to achieve. Article 235 should be retained, but only used as a last 
resort and after assent of the EP.' 
'... the reform of the Treaties requires institutionalization of the principle of the 
"necessary means"'. 
(b) Powers and responsibilities of the Union 
'I. Objectives and policies of the Union 
... The European Union will have to reinforce its existing framework of policies if it 
is to respond to economic and political change and to enhance its credibility in the· 
eyes of its citizens. To do this it will have to develop new policies for the future and 
to strengthen its existing policies. Consolidation of this kind is conceivable only in the 
perspective of a merger of the three pillars and within a single institutional 
framework'. 
The EP is not advocating a direct transfer of powers in the fields of justice and home 
affairs. On the other hand, it is calling for the. Community domain gradually to 
encompass: 
(c) 
asylum policy 
policy as regards crossing the Member States' external borders 
policy as regards checks on movements across the Member States' external 
borders 
immigration policy 
policy in relation to third-country nationals 
policy on the fight against drug addiction 
policy to combat serious international crime. 
As regards the horizontal demarcation of responsibilities (i.e. in terms 
of the Community institutions) · 
'The Treaty should provide for a separation between the provisions covering the 
Institutions and those covering the content of policies'. 
2. Dury and Maij-Weggen report 
(a). Recital F 
whereas the strengthening of existing policies which is needed will not be possible 
except in the context of merging the three pillars in a single institutional and legal 
framework and with due respect for the princioles of subsidiarity and solidarity, 
(b). Paragraph 3 
The European Parliament 'considers that, by 1999, an adequate system of own 
resources should be established in accordance with the principles of solidarity 
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between the Member States, subsidiarity[ ... ], so as to guarantee the autonomy of 
the Union and the effectiveness of its action; [ ... )'. 
B. European Commission 
* Exoerience acquired in implementing the subsidiarity principle 
'In October 1992 it [the Commission] ... presented Parliament and the Council with 
its views on the effect to be given to the [subsidiarity 1 principle. It set out its view 
of the scope of the areas in which powers are shared, in accordance with the second 
paragraph of Article 3b, as distinct from the areas where the Union has exclusive 
powers. In December 1992 it went on to present the Edinburgh European Council 
with a list of items of legislation proposed or in force which it considered might be 
reviewed in the light of the subsidiarity principle. It was asked to report each year to 
Parliament and the European Council on the application of the principle.' (Coi'T)mission 
report, p. 29) 
According to the Commission, the IGC's task is not to enhance the Union's powers. 
* Shortcomings in the implementation of subsidiarity 
Although the Union institutions have equipped themselves with the means of jointly 
giv· ng effect to the subsidiarity principle, practical experience shows that difficulties 
arise: 
- in determining the place which subsidiarity should occupy in Community legislative 
procedures; . 
- because the legislative texts adopted continue to be unduly detailed on account of 
the desire to protect the specific interests of particular groups. 
* Proposals to consolidate subsidiarity 
(i) The Commission is not proposing to make any alterations to Article 3b. 
(j) The Commission is not proposing to· delete Article 235. 
* Powers and responsibilities of the Union 
With regard to the Community sphere, the Commission is proposing new powers for 
the Union in its policies on employment, energy and public services. However, it is 
against reforming the vertical demarcation of responsibilities. The Commission is 
critical of the demarcation as it affects the areas falling under Community 
responsibility on the one hand and those covered in Titles V and VI on the other. 
With regard to the Commission's opinion on the convening of the IGC, a single 
phrase, 'do less, but better' is devoted to the application of the subsidiarity principle. 
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C. Council 
* Assessment of the imolementation of the subsidiarity princiole 
(a) According to the Council report, the introduction of the subsidiarity principle is a 
useful means of enha·ncing the effectiveness of Community decision-making and 
bringing the Union closer to its citizens. 
(b) There is further room for improvement in the manner of giving practical effect to 
the principle: 
- Community legislation is in some cases still encumbered with an. excess of detail; 
- subsidiarity is at times interpreted too sweepingly, and wrongly equated with· 
deregulation. ·posing the risk that the acquis communautaire mav be called into 
question. 
* Powers and responsibilities 
(c) The Council is not proposing to make any alterations to Article 3b. 
(d) The Council is not proposing to delete Article 235. 
(e) The Council is not proposing any new powers for the Union or that the vertical 
demarcation of responsibilities be reformed. 
0. Committee of the Regions 
* Proposed new wording of Article 3b 
{a) The Community shall .take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States or regional or local authorities exercising the powers conferred on them under 
the national law of the Member States. 
* lmolications of the new wording of Article 3b 
(b) The Committee of the Regions is calling for a right of appeal to the Court of 
Justice, whether to bring applications for annulment or to institute proceedings for 
failure to act. It is accordingly proposing to amend the third paragraph of Article 173: 
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the European 
Parliament, the ECB, or the Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting their 
prerogatives. It shall likewise have jurisdiction to rule on actions brought by the Committee of 
the Regions on account of a failure to observe the principle of subsidiarity. It shall also be 
competent to rule on actions brought by regions in cases where their legislative powers are 
affected by a regulation, directive, or decision. 
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If, in the 'post-1996' situation, the Committee of the Regions does not become a 
genuine institution within the meaning of the Treaty, it is proposing that Article 175 
be amended as follows: 
Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, 
fail to act, the Member States·, other institutions of the Community, or the Committee of the 
Regions may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established. 
(c) The Committee of the Regions wishes to work together with the Commission 
when the latter draws up the legislative programme or green and white papers and 
issues new legislation having a bearing on the powers of the regions and local 
authorities. 
* Prooosal to clarify powers and responsibilities 
(d) The Committee of the Regions is proposing that the powers o~ the Union and the 
Member States be exactly clarified. It believes that their r_espective powers should be 
defined, but is not calling for them to be laid down in an itemized list. 
(e) To consolidate the Union's powers, the Committee is calling for: 
Article 75 of the EC Treaty (regional planning, transport across the territory of one 
or more Member States) to be reworded; · 
a new version of Article 128 of the EC Treaty (cultural policy to bring about 
European citizenship; cooperation among Member States, regions, cities, and 
conurbations; preservation of the architectural heritage; greater understanding and 
wider dissemination of the culture and ~istory of third countries with which 
Member States have ties; cooperation whereby regions and cities would join 
forces with the third countries, regions, and cities represented in the Council of 
Europe and with Unesco); 
a new version of Article 130a (cooperation among regions and local authorities on 
an interregional, cross-border basis); 
a new version of Article 130r (state of the environment in the various regions and 
urban and rural districts). 
(f) As regards the introduction of .new powers ·(for the Unjon), the c;:ommittee is 
calling for a: 
new article on policy for cities; 
new article on regional planning policy; 
new article on water management policy; 
new article on energy policy; 
(g) The Committee is proposing that its right to be consulted be extended to include 
the following: 
- 8 - PE 166.255 
all matters on which the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is consulted 
Article 130w (development policy) 
Article Be (policy with regard to citizenship of the Union) 
Article 94 (State aids). 
E. Report of the Reflection Group 
'69. The Group stresses the importance of correct application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 3b of the Treaty and confirmed 
by an Interinstitutional Agreement on its implementation ... Most members of the 
Group do not feel it advisable to amend Article 3b of the Treaty but thin~ it necessary 
to ensure that it is properly exercised in practice ... ' 
I ••• It is thought by some members that there is a need for more effective control over 
application of this principle by ... the Commission by II ex-ante II co~trol and the 
Court of Justice by "ex-post" control ... Various representatives have insisted that 
on the basis of the Edinburgh Declaration a Protocol on subsidiarity should be 
incorporated to the Treaty ... ' 
' ... A very large majority within the Group is opposed to the request made by the 
Committee of the Regions ... that it be authorized to bring proceedings before the 
Court of Justice for incorrect application of the principle of subsidiarity ... ' 
'125. The Group is not in favour of incorporating a catalogue of the Union's powers 
in the Treaty ... It is therefore in favour of maintaining Article 235 as the instrument 
for dealing with the changing nature of interpretation of the Union's objectives.' 
F. Report by the Italian Presidency on the progress of the IGC 
1 . The rapporteur takes the view that the wording of the second paragraph of Article 
3b should be left unchanged. 
2. 'Should agreement be reached on the principle of inc:;orporating provisions on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty, incorporation could be in the 
form of a Protocol or a Declaration in the Final Act. Such provisions could be based 
on the existing Interinstitutional Agreement, and, if appropriate, the Edinburgh and 
Birmingham Declarations (of the European Council). I 
To this effect, the Italian Presidency has submitted a draft protocol/declaration on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle. 
3. Judicial control of the subsidiarity principle: judicial control of the subsidiarity 
principle I should continue to be carried out under the arrangements currently laid 
down for controlling the legality of Community acts'. 
The Group of Government Representatives also discussed the possibility of granting 
·national parliaments and/or the Committee of the Regions the right to bring matters 
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before the Court of Justice for the purposes of controlling respect for the subsidiarity 
principle. 
4. Political control of the subsidiarity principle: the Group of Government 
Representatives discussed proposals from the French delegation involving the creation 
of a High Parliamentary Co~ncii/High Advisory Committee on Subsidiarity comprising 
delegates from the national parliaments, which could control the application of the 
principle. 
G. Member States 
Belgium 
1 . Bonn CO SAC meeting (position of the delegation from the· two Chambers of the 
Belgian Parliament): 
European Union directives are too detailed and specific, whereas the only 
obligation they should entail is that of achieving a result. 
2. Official position 
In its note to Parliament on government policy regarding the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference, which it endorsed at its meeting of 28 July 1995, the Cabinet took the 
view that the existing means of giving effect to subsidiarity were operating correctly. 
It therefore did not believe that the orinciole should be altered or reworked. Belgium 
considered subsidiarity to be a corner-stone of the relationship linking the European 
Union, the federal State, and the regions and communities. The Government did not 
feel that the oowers of the Union should be set out in a detailed list. since this would 
scarcely be consistent with the changing. ongoing nature of European integration. It 
also believe~ that Article 235 of the Treaty should ~emain in olace. 
3. Other views 
According to Prime Minister Jean-luc Dehaene, Belgium is willing to consider any 
proposal relating to implementation of the subsidiarity principle. However, he does 
not believe that changes or a reworking are genuinely called for at this point in time. 
As regards powers and responsibilities, Mr Dehaene, addressing a PPE Group 
conference, maintained that the legislative activity of the Community institutions 
should serve only to lay down fundamental principles and rules required to attain 
objectives connected with the general interest or the smooth running of the single 
market. 
Regarding the proposed lists of powers, he felt that any ad hoc, predetermined, and 
inflexible demarcation of responsibilities deriving from a list of powers should be 
rejected. 
The Prime Minister does not believe that Article 235 should be repealed or potential 
competence abolished. 
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The own-initiative report of 30 March 1995, drawn up by Mr Eyskens on behalf of 
the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, recommends that the concept of subsidiarity 
be used with caution, given that some Member States perceive it as a means of 
removing the components of the acquis communautsire from the scope of 
Community control. It makes the point that the subsidiarity principle applies only in 
areas not falling ~ithin the Union's exclusive competence. 
The report expresses grave reservations about the idea of compiling lists of powers 
conferred on an exclusive basis and comes down against it because it would serve 
to undermine the Community framework and obstruct the continued development of 
the Union's responsibilities. 
4. Views of the communities and regions (summary of the joint document drawn up 
by the communities and regions and the Special Co-mmittee on Institutional 
Affairs,· Cdr di 38/95UKK/am) 
The Flemish Government is calling for the subsidiarity principle to be spelt out in 
greater detail. As regards the powers and responsibilities of the Union and the 
Member States, it is calling for clarification of Articles 1 27 (vocational training), 1 28 
(culture), and 1 30r (there should be a reference to sustainable development in 
connection with environmental policy, which must be more closely linked in future 
with transport and traffic policy). 
The Government of Brussels Capital Region maintains that the subsidiarity principle 
should be worded in more clear-cut terms. With regard to the powers and 
responsibilities of the Union and the Member States, it is calling for the areas falling 
within the Union's exclusive competence to be laid d~wn in detail (common farm 
price policy, Community rules on competition, Community pol~cy on trade in goods, 
monetary union). It doe·s not believe, however, that the EU's responsibilities should 
be extended to include energy and tourism .. 
The Wallonian Regional Government shares the views of the Flemish Government on 
the institutional status of the Committee of the Regions, the Committee's right to 
institute proceedings before the Court of Justice for failure to observe the subsidiarity 
principle, extension of the scope of mandatory consultation, and clarification of the 
subsidiarity principle. As far as powers and responsibilities are concerned, it is calling 
for the articles on education and vocational training, ·culture, and health to be 
broadened and a new article to be inserted to deal specifically with sport. 
The German-speaking community is calling for the status of the Committee of the 
Regions to be elevated to that of an institution, the range of matters on which the 
Committee must be consulted to be widened, and for the Committee to be provided 
with its own administrative machinery. 
Denmark 
1 . Official position 
In its report entitled 'Agenda for Europe', the Foreign Ministry does not refer explicitly 
to the subsidiarity principle. It does, however, mention three options to explore when 
reform is discussed: 
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list of powers, 
detailed definition of the responsibilities of Union institutions, 
new definition of the subsidiarity principle. 
2. Other views 
The Danish 'European Council', comprising Members of the Folketing, the European 
Parliament, various associations, and representatives of the two sides of industry, 
held a meeting in late November 1994, and reform of the Treaties was one of the 
items on the agenda. 
The Social Democrats are calling for a clear-cut definition of the subsidiarity .principle 
and, as a means to that end, for a list of powers specifying the respective 
responsibilities of the Union, the Member States, and the regions. They maintain that 
social P.olicy should not be the responsibility of the Union. 
The Conservative People's Party believes that the subsidiarity principle must be made 
one of the central topics at the 1996 IGC. More specifically, the Conservatives are 
calling for the areas that it governs to be spelt out in more explicit detail. The powers 
and responsibilities of the Union and the Member States should be clarified. As far 
as that point is concerned, the Conservative view is that policies relating to health. 
education. the arts. and tourism should no longer be the subject of Community 
legislati~n. 
The Centre Democrats consider that the subsidiarity principle needs to be defined 
with greater rigour. To bring this about, they are calling for a clear-cut, explicit 
demarcation of the responsibilities falling to the Member States. the regions. and the 
Union, laid down on the basis of a list of powers. · 
The SF (left-wing socialist party) feels that the definition of subsidia.rity will have to 
be tightened up. The powers of the Union will need to be spelt out ·and made .subject 
to. the proviso that the actio~· through which they are exercised must proceed on an 
international scale. 
To consolidate the subsidiarity principle, the Liberals are proposing that a· list of 
powers be drawn up with the aim of determining which responsibilities should be 
exercised by the Union, the Member States, or regional and local authorities. Policies 
on social affairs, tourism, and the arts should cease to be covered in Community 
legislation. 
Germany 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the German Bundesrat delegation) 
The Bundesrat notes that the subsidiarity principle removes the need for a good many 
Union acts, for instance in the fields of consumer protection, health, agrarian law and 
road transport. 
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It is calling for a clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between the Union and the 
Member States. It has compiled a list of Union provisions and proposals contrary to 
the subsidiarity principle. 
It is calling for the subsidiarity principle to be applied in areas falling within the 
Community's exclusive competence. 
2. Views of the Federal Government 
The Federal Government (CDU-CSU-FDP coalition agreement) considers that the 
manner of giving effect to the subsidiarity principle will need to occupy a key place 
at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. At the Conference, the Government will 
continue to urge compliance with, and call for additions to, the 'subsidiarity list', the-
system whereby Union legislation in force will be examined in order to check that it 
is consistent with Article 3b of the Treaty and, where necessary, repealed. 
It will also endeavour to secure a clear-cut demarcation of tasks between the Union 
and the Member States. The coalition agreement cites tourism and disaster 
prevention/civilian rescue services as examples of areas in which a review is required 
in order to ascertain that existing Community powers are compatible with the 
subsidiarity principle. To clarify- the meaning of Article 3b of the EC Treaty, the 
Government maintains that the burden of proof should b~ reversed by deleting the 
final words of the second paragraph, namely' ... and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community'. 
3. Other statements issued by the Government and German Ministers 
At the Reflection Group meeting held in Brussels on 24 and 25 July 1995, Mr Hoyer, 
a German member, proposed that a 'sunset clause' be inserted in the Treaty whereby 
a Commission pr-oposal would have to lapse if the Council failed to respond within 
the time-limits laid do-wn and/or 
a Community act would be_ declared null and void after a given expiry date. 
As far as the official position is concerned, the two government statements on 
European policy (issued on 22 June 1995 and 7 December f995) and its reply to the 
oral question (Grolle Anfrage) by Mr Christian Sterzing, Membe.r of the Bundestag, 
and the Alliance '90-Green Group (see Bundesrninister des Auswartigen; Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die GroBe Anfrage BT-Drs. 13/1471 ... , Bonn, Bundestags-
Drucksache 13/3198, 1 December 1995) speak of strengthening the subsidiarity 
principle and enforcing it more effectively. 
The document entitled 'Deutsche Ziele fur die Regierungskonferenz' (German aims at 
the IGC), drawn up by the Foreign Minister and published on 26 March 1996, takes 
the view that the subsidiarity principle could be clarified through the introduction of 
a protocol on subsidiarity. In his statement to the Commission representation in Bonn 
on 11 June 1996, Mr Hoyer confirmed this proposal and stated that, 'at least', such 
a protocol should be drawn up on the basis of the conclusions of the Edinburgh 
Council and the Interinstitutional Declaration of November 1993. Nevertheless, Mr 
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Hoyer pointed out that the subsidiarity principle should not be used as a means of 
renationalizing the Union. 
The initial position (as set out in the coalition agreement between the CDU. CSU and 
FOP) no longer constitutes official government policy. 
3. Position of the German Lander 
The Bundesrat resolution adopted on 1 5 December 1 995 sets out the official views 
of the Lander. Regarding subsidiarity and demarcation of responsibilities, the Lander 
are calling for several Treaty articles to be reworded: 
Article 3b, second paragraph (new wording) 
The Community shall take action,· in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States or regional and local authorities ·on which powers 
have been conferred by the national law of the Member States. 
As far as the division of powers is concerned, the Bundesrat favours clear-cut, 
explicit demarcation of responsibilities between the EU and the Member States. 
In future, the Union should act only by virtue of expressly defined responsibilities. 
The iist of the EU's objectives, at present couched in very vague terms, should be 
replaced by a list of specific powers, divided up according to fields of activity. 
Opting for a half-way house between a list of objectives and a list of powers, it 
might be possible to draw up a list of tasks referring to ·the specific rules laid 
down in the Treaty as regards the exercise of powe_rs. 
The Lander are thus proposing that Article 3 be rephrased, the introductory clause 
reading as follows: 
Without prejudice to Article 3b and in accordance with the powers conferred on 
it by ·this Treaty, the Community shall be entrusted with tasks in the following 
areas: 
and that the first paragraph of Article 3b be amended to read: 
The Community shall act solely within the limits of the powers expressly confe~red 
on it by this Treaty. · 
To give practical expression to the above proposals, the Lander have compiled a 
proposed list of powers to be exercised by the Union on an exclusive, non-
exclusive, or additional basis (see Bundesrat resolution entitled 'Forderungen der 
Lander zur Regierungskonferenz 1996', Drucksa.che 667/95 (BeschluB), 15 
December 1995, pp. 12-15 and 16-21). 
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The Bundesrat is proposing that the words 'energy' and 'tourism' be deleted in 
Article 3(t). 
It is calling for the principle of fair cooperation (Article 5) to be redefined by: 
1. deleting the .final sentence, 
2. inserting the following second and third sentences: 
In exercising its powers, the Community shall likewise take account of the 
interests and internal systems of the Member States. The Community and the 
Member States shall be required to engage in fair cooperation. 
Greece 
1. Official position 
The Greek Government memorandum 'For a democratic EU with political and social 
content' (March 1996) takes the view that the subsidiarity principle should be 
enforced in a more systematic way. 'The principle of subsidiarity[ ••. ] should be used 
as an instrument for strengthening the role of the citizen, the local authorities and the 
regions within the integration process; it should not be used as a means to alter the 
acquis communautaire, to renationalize Community policies, to retard the 
development of the Union, or as a means to expand unduly the Union's 
competences.' 
With regard to the powers and responsibilities of the Union, it is calling for: 
more effective policies to guarantee the safety of workers, 
a more effective equal opportunities policy, 
a more effective health policy, for exa~ple where drugs and Aids are concerned, 
a more effective policy to protect consumers' rights,. 
a genuine industrial policy, 
energy and disaster prevention policies established on a formal footing. 
·Spain 
1 . Official position 
A document submitted to the country's -.Parliament by the previous Spanish 
Government sets out a specific, accurately defined view on reform of the subsidiarity 
principle. The previous Spanish Government considered that inclusion of an Article 
3b on the subsidiarity principle was contrary to the Spanish proposals. 
Regarding the 1996 IGC, it did not advocate a list of powers or deletion of Article 
235. 
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France 
1 • Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the French Senate delegation) 
The delegation feels that, in general, there are too many rules and regulations. It is 
proposing that a body formed by representatives of the national parliaments be made 
responsible for monitoring compliance with subsidiarity (see the background report 
of 12 November 1992 on the subsidiarity principle, drawn up on behalf of the Senate 
Delegation for the European Communities by Mr Michel Poniatowski). 
The Senate and the National Assembly are calling for subsidiarity to be applied in 
areas falling within the Community's exclusive competence. 
2. Views expressed by the President and the Government 
The French guidelines for the 1996 IGC (government report of 13 November 1995) 
state that the subsidiarity principle will need to be enforced more effectively. 
The former Minister for European Affairst Mr Alain Lamassoure, believes that the 
1996 IGC will need to produce an itemized list of powers, couched in consistent, 
specific terms and based on the subsidiarity principle. 
The President of the Republic, Mr Jacques Chirac, considers that the national 
parliaments should be entitled to 'demur on the grounds of subsidiarity', enabling 
them to have a say in the process of framing Union legislation. 
The French Government is proposing that national parliaments should be able to 
express their views at an early stage in the Council's decisions, particularly to enforce 
subsidiarity. Mr Barnier, French Government representative at the IGC, pointed out 
in his government statement on the.IGC to the National Assembly ·on 13 March ~ 996 
that France was proposing the -establishment of a High Parliamentary Council. 
co_mprising several representatives of each national parliament, which would be 
consulted on any questions of subsidiarity linked to any issues covered by the third 
pillar. 
Several political parties and parliamentary groups repres_ented in. the Senate (APR, 
Centrist Union, and PS) are proposing that a hierarchy of norms/acts be laid down. 
The Social Democratic Centre Party is calling for a hierarchy of acts to be introduced, 
modelled on Articles 34 to 37 of the French Constitution. The party believes that 
such a step would put an end to the present disorder as regards· legislation by 
distinguishing between framework laws, laying down the fundamental Principles and 
essential rules of Union policies, regulations, for which the Council would be solely-
responsible, and implementing texts, which, in accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle, would be the responsibility of the Member States. Indeed, Member States 
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should be entitled to appeal directly to the Court of Justice whenever the Treaties 
were infringed in that connection. 2 
Ireland 
1 . Official position 
In its White Paper 'Challenges and opportunities abroad', the Irish Government sets 
out its view that the subsidiarity principle '[ •.. ] has proved a useful one. If any 
attempt is made at the IGC to define further the concept of subsidiarity it will be 
important broadly to maintain the present balance between Community and member 
state competence. Apart from the Treaty provisions on subsidiarity itself, the· 
importance attached to subsidiarity will play a key role in relation to many of the 
other issues arising at the IGC'. 
Italy 
1 • Bonn COSAC meeting 
The delegation from the Chamber of Deputies maintains that the subsidiarity principle 
reflects the desire to coordinate national law and Community rules more closely, 
without seeking to weaken the European Union. The principle applies to areas in 
which Community and national bodies have concurrent competence. However, it 
should be understood in a broader sense, as a yardstick for allocating powers to the 
different standard-setting tiers. 
2. Official position 
The government memorandum on revision of the Maastricht Treaty (presented in the 
Chamber of Deputies on 23 May .1995) notes that the IGC will need to work out a 
clear definition of standard-setting instruments and a hierarchy of legislative acts. As 
far as the subsidiarity principle is concerned, the Government does not believe that 
the Union should be called upon to shoulder an unduly heavy burden of responsibility. 
Instead, subsidiarity should be. employed in a flexible way and defi~ed more clearly 
in order to avert a plethora of rules and regulatio~s not only at Union level, but also 
in the Member States. Moreover, the Government does not consider it advisable to 
draw up a list of areas falling within the Union's exclusive competence. The better 
course, according to the government memorandum, would be to lay down a hierarchy 
of acts consisting of the following three tiers: 
constitutional provisions 
legislative provisions, setting out the general framework for each sector of activity 
or matter to be dealt with; and 
The future of European integration, Tenth Conference of the CDS, 10 and 
11 December 1994. 
- 17 - PE 166.255 
regulations and implementing provisions, which should be the responsibility of the 
Commission unless the Member States are required to take the necessary action 
themselves in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. 
In its 'position of the Italian Government on the IGC' dated 18 March 1996 the Italian 
Government proposes including a protocol in the EU Treaty on the application of the 
subsidiarity principle. 'Adequate importance should be given to the principles of 
subsidiarity. proximity and proportionality [ ... ]. For this reason, we could accept to 
annex to the Treaty a protocol containing some of the elements of the "code of 
conduct" agreed upon at the European Council of ·Edinburgh. However, the excessive 
and instrumental importance of subsidiarity might weaken the Commission's capacity 
for proposing, break up the Single Market and disperse the uniformity of Community 
law.' 
As regards introducing new areas of policy in the EU Treaty, the Government takes 
the view that 'the inclusion of certain policies in the Treaty (energy, tourism, civil 
protection) [ ... ] would help the citizens to see the Union more positively.' 
Luxembourg 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The Chamber of Deputies delegation considers that there are too many Community 
rules and regulations relating, for example, to public contracts or finance or stemming 
from the propensity to alter the own resources system. 
Implementation of the .subsidiarity principle should be supervised by the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament. 
2. Official position of the Government 
The Luxembourg memorandum on the 1996 IGC (issued on 30 June 1995) maintains 
that the subsidiarity principle should be enforced systematically. The Government 
notes that there is nothing in the TEU implying a need to create .new powers .. 
Speaking on 16 February 1995, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Poos, observed 
that the subsidiarity principle needed to be translated into action to ensure that the 
Union could gain the support of the public at large. -
He proposes that the tasks of the Union and the means/measures to be employed to 
accomplish them should be made a more prominent focus of attention. In his 
statement· on foreign policy of 8 February 1996, Mr Poos reiterated these 
Government priorities. 
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The Netherlands 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The Eerste Kamer delegation believes that the subsidiarity principle could shackle the 
Commission's right of initiative and even give rise to abuses. That being the case, it 
is necessary to determine the criteria that would allow or require proposals for 
Regulations or Directives to be withdrawn or revised. The Eerste Kamer rejects the 
proposal (from the German Bundesrat delegation) to apply the subsidiarity principle 
in areas falling within the Community's ·exclusive competence, since to do so could 
jeopardize Community machinery and policies, needlessly bolster the tendency to 
pursue bilateral action, and undermine the Commission's right of initiative. 
2. Official position 
In· its report on institutional reform of the European Union, the Netherlands 
Government maintains that the IGC should concentrate on the .smooth running of the 
internal market. Whenever it submits a proposal, the Commission should accordingly 
say why Community rules are necessary. This obligation to state reasons could be 
laid down in the Treaty. Statements of grounds should cover three main points: 
subsidiarity: why are Community rules required? 
proportionality: would it not be sufficient to adopt a less stringent and detailed 
form of regulation? 
costs and benefits, vulnerability to fraud, and compliance with legislation. 
Furthermore, the Government suggests that the admissibility of a proposal be 
discussed in a. gene·ral public debate in the Co.uncil·on the basis of_ the statement of 
grounds and the responses thereto. It believes that checks on compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle should be backed by the necessary guarantees, including the 
existing possibility of instituting proceedings befo.re the· Court of Justice. (The 
Netherlands and Europe- the 1996 IGC, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 
1995, p. 284).' 
In its report 'Between Madrid and Turin: Dutch priorities on the eve of the 1996 IGC_' 
published in March 1996, the Netherlands Government set out its views on including 
the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council (on the application of the 
subsidiarity principle): 'In order to make these rules effective, the IGC should consider 
making them legally binding'. 
Portugal 
1 . Bonn COSAC meeting 
The delegation from the Assembleia da Republica considers that there is a plethora 
of legislation in fields having a strong impact on budgetary policy. On the other hand, 
there are not enough Community rules in areas entaili~g relatively low Community 
expenditure. 
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The subsidiarity principle must not, under any circumstances, impede the work of the 
Community or be interpreted a priori. 
With regard to the proposal (from the German Bundesrat delegation) for the 
subsidiarity principle to be applied in areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence, the Portuguese Parliament feels that the principle could enable 
adjustments to be made in.the areas concerned and, in some cases, provide grounds 
for certain policies to be returned to national control. 
2. Official position 
In its memorandum 'Portugal and the IGC' published in March 1996, the Portuguese 
Government opposes the introduction of a list or catalogue of powers and 
responsibilities of the Union and the Member States. As regards the application of 
the subsidiarity principle, the Government takes the view that the conclusions of the 
European Council and the Interinstitutional Declaration of November 1993 are 
sufficient instruments. 
3. Position of Parliament 
The country's Parliament studied the implementation of the subsidiarity principle at 
length in February 1995, in its report on the parliamentary response to the revision 
of the Treaty on European Union at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The 
document notes that the concept of subsidiarity does not just relate to the balance 
between the Community and the Member States, but on the contrary, it also has to 
do with the role of the citizen and society vis-a-vis the State, as referred to in Article 
A of the Treaty. To that extent, it could even constitute a first step towards 
clarification, in a Community for which it is difficult to find defining theoretical 
models. 
The subsidiarity principle has been invoked on numerous occasions by way of an 
apology for devotion to national sovereignty. or with the aim of accentuating regional 
·idiosyncrasies. It has been invoked to· obstruct the development of common policies. 
However, the principle is linked to the idea of effectiveness and, as such, must never 
be used to call the nature of Community action into question, since. to do so would 
be tantamount to distortion. In addition, the document produced by the Portuguese 
Parliament discusses how implementation of the subsidiarity principle should be 
monitored. 
Leaving aside the three-way advance checks by the Commission, the Council, and the 
European Parliament (under the interinstitutional agreement on procedures for 
implementing the principle of subsidiarity, which entered into force at the same time 
as the TEU), the Portuguese Parliament believes that the national parliaments would 
be qualified to exercise political scrutiny. However, it does not say which 
parliamentary assemblies would be in the most suitable position to do so. 
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Austria 
1. Official position 
The 'guidelines' on the 1996 IGC, published by the Austrian Government in April or 
May 1995 (the document is undated), state that the subsidiarity principle must be 
strictly enforced. The principle is regarded as a means of apportioning tasks more 
efficiently to each different level, be it European, national, or regional. 
In its 'Basic Positions' published on 26 March 1996, the Austrian Government 
declares itself in favour of the introduction of a protocol on the application of the 
subsidiarity principle based on the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council.· 
With regard to the problem of political control of the subsidiarity principle, the 
Government has declared itself open to the active involvement of the national 
parliaments. Finally, the Government notes that it has submitted to the Reflection 
Group the position of the Austrian provinces aimed at granting the Committee of the 
Regions and regions with legislative powers the right to institute proceedings before 
the Court of Justice. 
Generally speaking, the Government believes that environmental policy and the fight 
against unemployment should constitute priorities for the Community. As regards 
creating new powers for the Union, it feels that: 
existing measures in- the field of energy would benefit if the Community were 
given a degree of responsibility for energy policy, · 
the TEU should lay down Community responsibilities for policy on disaster 
prevention and emergency action, 
it will not be necessary to confer powers on the Community with respect to 
tourism policy. 
The Government considers a possible future hierarchy of acts to be a n:-atter of some 
·interest. However,· the institutions of the Union will need to be brought into the 
appropriate balance. 
2. Views of the provinces 
On 4 May 1995 the ·Conference of Provincial Governors and the Conference of 
Provincial Assembly Presidents adopted a detailed resolution on the 1996 IGC. The 
provinces are taking a similar line to the Committee of the Regions as regards the 
subsidiarity principle and the right of the Committee of the Regions and regional 
authorities with legislative powers to institute proceedings before the Court of 
Justice. As far as redefinition of the subsidiarity principle is concerned, the new 
wording of Article 3b, second paragraph, proposed by the Governors' Conference is 
similar to the proposal put forward at their Conference by the Ministers of the 
German Lander responsible for European affairs. In addition, the provinces are calling 
for the Committee of the Regions to be involved in the Interinstitutional Agreement 
on subsidiarity or in a new 'Subsidiarity Chamber'. 
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Finland 
1 • Official position 
In its statement to Parliament on 14 February 1995, the Finnish Government 
maintained that the subsidiarity principle should be enforced rigorously and with care. 
The 'Memorandum concerning Finnish points of view with regard to the 1996 
. Intergovernmental Conference of the EU', issued on 18 September 1995, makes the 
point that subsidiarity is a political rather than legal principle. According to this 
document, subsidiarity should be the guiding principle where extension of the Union's 
powers is concerned. 
The Finnish Government's communication to Parliament on Finland's ideas and 
objectives in anticipation of the 1996 IGC (issued on 27 February 1996) states that 
there is no need to amend Article 3b of the Treaty. To make for greater ·Clarity, a 
protocol on the subsidiarity principle, based on the Edinburgh Declaration, should be 
incorporated in the Treaty. 
Sweden 
1 . Official position 
According to the Swedish Government, which. stated its position on ~he IGC in an 
initial document drawn up for Parliament in July 1995 entitled 'Sweden's interests 
in the run-up to the 1996 IGC' and, in late November 1995 (after holding several 
rounds of consultations with a parliamentary group called upon to consider the earlier 
document) adopted 'Swedish government report 1995/96:30: the. 1996 EU IGC', the 
subsidiarity principle will be one of the main items on the agenda fo.r the 1996 IGC. 
The Government maintains that the principle should be enforced mc;>r:e effectively, but 
is not in favour of amending the relevant articles of. the Treaty. 
It is calling in this connectio.n for a right of initiative to be granted to the European 
Parliament with respect to Union legislative acts. 
At the end of a joint hearing organized by the Swedish Government and Parliament 
on 22 and 23 May 1995, the Government appointed an ad hoc committee, the 
Swedish Parliamentary Committee on the 1996 IGC, · which will deal with 
implementation of the subsidiarity principle 0 
United Kingdom 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The British parliamentary delegation maintained that not only the number of European 
regulations, but also European law as such, which was often perceived as a diktat or 
a form of interference, was giving rise to very widespread anxieties extending beyond 
individual sectors. Generally speaking, the subsidiarity principle had been welcomed 
in the United Kingdom, although there were still considerable doubts as to its 
effectiveness in practice 0 
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The two parliamentary committees specializing in European affairs have expressed 
misgivings about various proposals for Directives drawn up by the Commission. 
The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities believes that the 
subsidiarity principle should apply in areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence. 
2. Views of the Government 
According to Mr Davis, the British junior Minister responsible for European affairs, the 
subsidiarity principle implies that action should be taken at Union level if, and only if, 
better results can be obtained jointly than by each country in isolatio.n, and even 
when that is the case, inopportune authoritarianism has to be avoided (Le Monde, · 
14 June 1995). In the same article, he put forward some ideas as to how the 
subsidiarity principle might be reformed. One option to which he referred was that of 
strengthening the provisions of the Treaty by inserting an additional r~ference, the 
wording of which had already been agreed in Council. Alternatively, the national 
parliaments could be given the right to demur on the grounds of subsidiarity. He said 
that the United Kingdom was willing to consider all possible means of achieving the 
above ends. 
At meetings of. the Reflection Group on the 1996 IGC, Mr Davis has proposed that 
the Treaty incorporate a 'sunset clause requiring the Commission to withdraw 
proposals which had not been agreed within a certain time' (Statement on the 
outcome of the 1996 IGC study group meetings of 10/11 July and 24/25 July 1995, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 26 July 1995). Responding to '1996 IGC', a 
report drawn up by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
Baroness Chalker of Wallasey, wrote: 
'The Government takes the view. that subsidiarity is a le.gal as well as political 
principle. and will therefore be taking steps at the IGC to ~trengthen the application. 
and imorove the justiciability. of Article 3b'. 
- 23 - PE 166.255 
H. Conclusions 
1. The subsidiarity principle and implementation of Article 3b 
Amendment 'Yes No Suggestions 
EP X Retain the principle and enforce it correctly 
Commission X Continue to simplify existing legislation and 
clarify the role of subsidiarity in legislative 
procedures 
Counci 1 X Clarify the role of subsidiarity to prevent it 
posing a challenge to the acquis communautaire 
COR X Reword Articles 3b, 173, third paragraph, and 175 
"TEC 
Belgium X 
Denmark x3 
Germany X The Lander are proposing to· reword Article 3b and 
to rephrase Article 5 accordingly. 
Greece X Enforce the subsidiarity principle more 
systematically 
Spain X 
France X Enforce subsidiarity more effectively. 
In October 1994 .the Senate called for the 
subsidiarity principle to be extended to cover 
areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence 
Ireland X 
With the exception of the Libeials, all Danish political parties are calling 
for the subsidiarity principle to be spelt out, clarified, and defined more 
accurately. 
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Amendment Yes No Suggestions 
Italy X 
Luxembourg X Enforce the principle systematically 
Netherlands x(+/-) The Commission should be required under the Treaty 
to justify its legislative proposals in terms of 
subsidiarity, proportionality, and the financial 
aspects 
Portugal X 
Austria X Rigorous enforcement of the subsidiarity principle 
Finland X Rigorous enforcement of the subsidiarity principle 
Add a protocol on subsidiarity to the TEU 
Sweden X Right of initiative for the EP 
United Kingdom X Government: Article 3b should be subject to Court 
jurisdiction 
In October 1994 the House of Lords called for the 
subsidiarity principle to be extended to cover 
areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence 
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2. Incorporation in the EU Treaty of a declaration/protocol based on the 
Edinburgh conclusions 
EP: no 
Commission: 
Council: 
COR: 
Belgium: 
Denmark: no 
Germany: 
Federal Government: yes 
Lander: yes 
Greece: no 
Spain: yes 
France: no 
Ireland: 
Italy: yes 
Luxembourg: no 
Netherlands: yes 
Portugal: yes 
Austria: yes· 
Finland: yes 
Sweden: no 
United Kingdom: yes 
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3. Vertical demarcation of powers conferred on the Union, the Member States, and 
the regions/Lists of powers 
The following favour vertical demarcation of powers by means of: 
EP: 
Commission: 
Counci 1: 
COR: 
Belgium: 
Denmark (parties): 
Germany: 
Federal 
Government: 
Lander: 
Greece: 
Spain: 
France: 
Ireland: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
Portuga 1: 
Austria: 
Finland: 
Sweden: 
United Kingdom: 
hierarchy of acts incorporating an 'implementing acts' category 
harmonization of the areas encompassed within the Community domain with 
those covered in Titles V and VI 
no 
clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between the Union and the 
Member States 
no 
list of the respective po~ers of the Union, the Member States, and the 
regions 
clear-cut demarcation of tasks between the Union and the Member States 
list of expressly defined powers 
no 
no 
itemized list of powers, 
hierarchy of acts, distinguishing between framework laws and 
implementing acts 
no 
hierarchy of acts, distinguishing between laws and regulations 
no 
no 
no 
better demarcation of the respective tasks of the EU, Member States, and 
the regions 
no 
no 
no 
- 27- PE 166.255 
4. Article 235 and potential competence 
The following: 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany: 
Government 
Lander 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
advocate are opposed to repeal of Article 235 
X 
X 
X 
x (Bavaria, Baden-Wurtternberg, Hesse) 
X 
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5. Proposals to 'curtail' the Union's responsibilities 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Government 
Lander 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Health, Education, Arts, Tourism 
Rescue services, Tourism, Employment 
Energy, Tourism 
Tourism 
Social policy, Tourism, Energy, Employment 
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6. Proposals for new (or wider) responsibilities for the Union, excluding Titles 
V and VI (see Briefings on these subjects) 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Social policy, Equal opportunities, Energy, CAP, 
Fisheries, Environment, Consumers, Transport, Tourism, 
Public services, Education, Training, Youth, External 
economic relations, Employment, Sport, Civil protection 
Employment, Energy, Public services, 
Policy for cities, Regional planning policy, Water 
management policy, Energy policy 
Sport, Public services 
Employment 
Social policy, Civil protection 
Safety of workers, Employment, Equal opportunities, 
Health, Consumers, Industry, Energy, Civil prot~tion, 
Tourism 
Employment, Public services 
Public services 
Tourism, Civil protection 
Employaent, Energy, Tourism, Civil protection 
Employment, sport 
Empl_oya~t 
Energy, Tourism, Civil .protection 
Employment, Energy·, Civil protection 
Employment 
Employment 
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